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Abstract 
Comprehensive  reforms  often  fail,  despite  being  beneficial  to  society.  Politicians  may  block 
comprehensive  reforms  in  an  attempt  to  form  vote  trading  coalitions  in  which  they  benefit  from  a 
piecemeal  reform  at  the  expense  of  others.  Because  formal  commitment  devices  for  vote  trading  are 
frequently missing, trust and reciprocity among legislators can play an important role for vote trading and 
consequently for resistance to comprehensive reform. We show in a laboratory experiment that trust and 
reciprocity causes resistance to comprehensive reform. Legislators strategically reject the comprehensive 
reform in environments in which trust and reciprocity facilitate vote trading whereas they accept the 
comprehensive reform else wise.  
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1  Introduction 
Comprehensive reforms often fail or become piecemeal during the preparatory phase of 
legislation. Such resistance to comprehensive reforms has been explained by uncertainty 
about outcomes of reforms (see e.g. Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991 and Cason and Mui, 
2003),  the  existence  of veto players (see  e.g. Tsebelis, 2002  and  Kagel et al., 2010), 
interest groups or wars of attrition (Alesina and Drazen, 1991 and Saint-Paul, 2002) and 
psychological constraints such as confirmatory bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988 
and Rabin and Schrag, 1999; for an excellent survey see also Heinemann, 2004). We 
provide a new rationale for resistance to reform: trust and reciprocity among legislators, 
which allow for vote trading without commitment devices.  
Facing a comprehensive reform, legislators in favor of a subset of individual bills 
included  in  the  comprehensive  reform  will  be  willing  to  impede  the  comprehensive 
reform if they expect their favorable subset to be implemented by a vote trade after 
comprehensive reform failure. For selfish legislators, such a vote trade requires formal 
commitment devices. Instead, if legislators trust and reciprocate, commitment devices 
for vote trading will not be necessary to trade votes.  
A  vast  amount  of  theoretical  (see  e.g.  Rabin,  1993;  Levine,  1998;  Bolton  and 
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk 
and Fischbacher, 2006 and Cox et al., 2007) and experimental work (e.g. Fehr et al., 
1998; Fehr and Gächter,1998; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Falk et al., 2008; Dohmen et al., 
2009)  has  underlined  the  importance  of  reciprocity  in  human  interactions.  People 
reward kind actions and punish unkind actions. Humans not only reciprocate, but also 
trust in reciprocal behavior by others (see e.g. Berg et al., 1995; McCabe et al., 1998 and 
Strassmair, 2009).  
The aim of this paper is first, to investigate the circumstances that facilitate trust 
and reciprocity among legislators facilitates vote trading, and second, to study how vote 
trading  based  on  trust  and  reciprocity  affects  the  willingness  to  resist  efficient 
comprehensive  reforms.  To  do  so,  we  conduct  a  laboratory  experiment  in  which  a 
committee  votes  on  an  efficient  comprehensive  reform  including  three  independent 
bills. The approval of each individual bill is efficient but only preferred by a minority. 3 
 
The comprehensive reform requires unanimity.3 If the comprehensive reform fails, the 
committee  may  still  pass  all  or  some  of  the  bills  in  a  sequential  bill-by-bill  voting 
procedure. In the sequential voting procedure the committee votes independently on 
each  bill  under  simple  majority  rule.  Because  in  the  experiment  each  bill  is  only 
preferred by a minority standard economic theory predicts no bill to be passed in the 
sequential  bill-by-bill  voting  procedure.  Consequently,  in  an  subgame  perfect 
equilibrium selfish legislators vote for the comprehensive reform. However, if legislators 
trust ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠreciprocity, ﾠlegislators ﾠwill ﾠexpect ﾠvote ﾠtrading ﾠon ﾠindividual ﾠbills ﾠafter ﾠ
reform failure to be possible. In turn, resistance to comprehensive reform may occur.  
The importance of trust and reciprocity for vote trading on individual bills after 
reform  failure  may  depend  on  the  transparency  of  the  voting  procedure  following 
comprehensive reform failure. If this voting procedure provides information on each 
legislators’ ﾠ votes ﾠ (open ﾠ ballot), ﾠ legislators  may  identify  their  potential  vote  trading 
partners. If, instead, information on individual voting behavior is missing (secret ballot), 
it will be impossible to direct reward to specific trading partners. We study resistance to 
comprehensive reform with both institutional settings, open and secret ballot with the 
possibility of voting for a comprehensive reform.  
We find that transparency in the sequential voting procedure is crucial for vote 
trading based on trust and reciprocity. In the open ballot treatments of our experiment 
we frequently observed vote trades in which two legislators passed their preferred bills 
at the expense of the third legislator. In the secret ballot treatments, vote trading based 
on trust and reciprocity turned out to be difficult. Vote trading possibilities in the open 
ballot  treatment  were  sufficient  to  cause  resistance  to  the  efficient  comprehensive 
reform. Legislators who expected vote trading to be possible (and beneficial to them) 
strategically  impeded  comprehensive  reforms  when  the  sequential  voting  procedure 
was  transparent.  Thus,  an  imperfect  device  for  vote  trading,  namely  a  transparent 
sequential  bill-by-bill  voting  procedure,  was  sufficient  to  cause  resistance  to 
comprehensive reform. Instead, secret voting procedures (i.e. individual voting behavior 
is not observable) reduced legislators’ ﾠtrust ﾠand, ﾠin ﾠturn, ﾠresistance ﾠto ﾠcomprehensive ﾠ
reform.  
                                                        
3 Many international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and MERCOSUR make use of unanimity rule and other supermajority rules. Also the European Union applies 
qualified majority rule for particularly sensitive issues (Maggi and Morelli, 2006). 4 
 
There has been an extensive discussion on the welfare effects of vote trading 
based on the seminal work by Tullock (1959). Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue that 
vote  trading  allows  for  the  representation  of  degrees  of  intensities  of  preferences: 
Legislators can trade votes on issues where their preferences are relatively weak against 
votes  on  issues  where  their  preferences  are  relatively  strong.  Thus  vote  trading  is 
mutually beneficial to those involved in the trade. Brams and Riker (1973) point out that 
although each vote trade may be beneficial to traders, there is a risk that third parties 
not involved in the trade bear a substantial part of the cost involved in the respective 
trade. When the cost for third parties exceeds the benefits from trades, subsequent vote 
trades may lead to a situation under which vote trades eventually make everyone worse 
off (the paradox of vote trading). McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) were the first to test 
Brams ﾠ and ﾠ Riker’s ﾠ paradox ﾠ of ﾠ vote ﾠ trading ﾠ experimentally. ﾠ They ﾠ observe ﾠ the ﾠ vote ﾠ
trading patterns predicted by Brams and Riker in a series of experiments with three and 
five  person  committees  and  a  face  to  face  communication  environment  with  formal 
commitment devices. However, in some of their experiments, committee members were 
allowed  to  cancel  vote  trades  when  all  members  involved  in  trading  agreed. 
Consequently,  Pareto-dominated  outcomes  were  eventually  replaced  by  canceling  all 
trades  under  unanimous  agreement  or  by  a  majority  coalition  implementing  its 
preferred outcome. In contrast to the study by McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) our 
subjects could not communicate face to face, nor in any other form. Further, our subjects 
were ﾠ completely ﾠ aware ﾠ of ﾠ the ﾠ impact ﾠ of ﾠ their ﾠ choices ﾠ on ﾠ others’ ﾠ payoffs ﾠ whereas ﾠ
McKelvey  and  Ordeshook  (1980)  assured  that  their  participants  were  not  informed 
about the exact amounts earned by others in order to exclude non-selfish motivations 
for vote trading.  
In contrast to the literature mentioned above, our contribution focuses on the 
impact of vote trading without  commitment devices  on  resistance to comprehensive 
reforms. We demonstrate that legislators can succeed in vote trading even when formal 
commitment devices and communication possibilities are missing. Legislators trust in 
their ﾠcounterparts’ ﾠreciprocity ﾠand ﾠvote ﾠfor ﾠbills ﾠcontrary ﾠto ﾠtheir ﾠ(induced) ﾠpreferences. ﾠ
Transparency  of  the  decision  making  procedure  provides  accountability  and  thus 
increases ﾠtrust ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠreciprocity. ﾠIn ﾠturn, ﾠwhen ﾠthe ﾠalternative ﾠvoting ﾠprocedure ﾠwas ﾠ
transparent,  vote  trading  occurred  and  resistance  to  the  comprehensive  reform  was 
profitable for those involved in trading.   5 
 
2  Experimental design 
In the experiment subjects form three-member committees and decide on an efficient 
comprehensive reform. The comprehensive reform includes three individual bills. Each 
bill  is  efficient,  but  preferred  by  only  one  member  of  the  committee.  A  committee 
member’s ﾠpreferred ﾠbill ﾠyields ﾠ6 ﾠadditional ﾠpoints ﾠfor ﾠherself, ﾠwhereas ﾠthe ﾠother ﾠtwo ﾠ
members of the committee incur a loss of two points each. Thus, if an individual bill is 
passed, gross payoff will increase by two points. Because only one participant of the 
group  gains  from  each  individual  bill,  each  individual  bill  is  disadvantageous  to  a 
majority of the group. Table 1 shows ﾠhow ﾠeach ﾠbill ﾠaffects ﾠthe ﾠparticipants’ ﾠpayoffs. ﾠThe 
participants are informed about ﾠtheir ﾠown ﾠand ﾠtheir ﾠcounterparts’ ﾠpayoffs.  
If the comprehensive reform is approved, all bills will be implemented, i.e. each 
participant receives two additional points. Passing the comprehensive reform requires 
unanimity. This allows us to elicit preferences against the comprehensive reform in an 
unambiguous  way  (voting  the  comprehensive  reform  down  will  always  lead  to 
comprehensive  reform  failure).  We  do  not  display  information  on  who  vetoes  the 
comprehensive reform in order to minimize fear of revenge as a reason to accept the 
comprehensive reform. 
If  at  least  one  member  vetoes  the  comprehensive  reform,  the  committee  will 
decide sequentially on the three individual bills under simple majority rule. We decided 
for a sequential procedure because it allows us to study the implications of reciprocal 
behavior among committee members on vote trading in a controlled environment. In the 
sequential bill-by-bill procedure, each bill can be passed or failed. First, all committee 
members simultaneously cast their votes on the first bill. Then, we inform the committee 
about the outcome of the vote. Second, each member casts her vote for the second bill. 
The second vote is displayed and the group decides on the third bill. Eventually, the 
outcome of the third vote and the resulting payoff changes are displayed.  
  Bill A  Bill B   Bill C 
Member A  +6  -2  -2 
Member B  -2  +6  -2 
Member C  -2  -2  +6 
Table 1: Bills and resulting payoff changes 6 
 
To ﾠtest ﾠwhether ﾠtrust ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠreciprocity leads to resistance to comprehensive 
reform, we vary the bill-by-bill voting procedure with respect to the information on 
individual  voting  behavior.  We  suppose  transparency  provides  accountability  and 
therefore  increases  trust  in  others’ ﾠ reciprocity.  The  committee  either  votes  in  a 
transparent bill-by-bill voting procedure (open ballot), in which individual voting be-
havior  is  observable,  or  in  a  secret  ballot,  where  only  the  outcome  of  each  vote  is 
displayed (secret ballot). 
Before  committee  members  decide  on  the  comprehensive  reform,  we  inform 
them about the alternative voting procedure and about the (random) order of bills in the 
alternative ﾠ procedure. ﾠ This ﾠ allows ﾠ us ﾠ to ﾠ infer ﾠ committee ﾠ members’ ﾠ reaction  to 
information about potential gainers and losers of each procedure. As further controls, 
we  run  additional  treatments  without  the  possibility  to  agree  on  a  comprehensive 
reform. In these treatments the committee decides on the three bills either in an open 
(OpenBallotNoCR)  or  secret  (SecretBallotNoCR)  bill-by-bill  voting  procedure  with 
simple  majority  rule.  We  can  thus  investigate  the  effect  of  transparency  on  trust  in 
others’ ﾠ reciprocity ﾠ in ﾠ a ﾠ controlled ﾠ environment  and  test  whether  the  failure  of  a 
comprehensive reform affects trust and reciprocity among committee members.  
We repeat the game for 12 periods to allow for learning and changes of voting 
behavior over time. In each period, each participant is randomly assigned into a group of 
three  participants  (stranger  matching).  The  random  matching  procedure  excludes 
individual reputation building. In sessions with at least 24 subjects we divided subjects 
into  two  separate  matching  groups.  Table  2  summarizes  the  number  of  subjects, 
sessions and treatments in detail. None of the subjects participated in more than one 
session. 
Each subject sat at a randomly assigned and separated PC terminal and was given 
a  copy of instructions.4 A set of control questions  ensured the  understanding of the 
game.  If  any  participant  repeatedly  failed  to  answer  correctly,  the  experimenter 
provided  an  oral  explanation.  No  form  of  communication  was  allowed  during  the 
experiment.  We  conducted  all  sessions  at  the  LakeLab  (University  of  Konstanz,  
 
                                                        
4 A copy of translated instructions can be found in the appendix.  7 
 
Treatment  # Subjects  # Sessions   # Matching 
Groups 
Comprehensive reform and open ballot 
(OpenBallotCR)  63  3   5 
Comprehensive reform and secret ballot 
(SecretBallotCR)  51  2  4 
No Comprehensive reform and open ballot 
(OpenBallotNoCR)  51  2   3 
No Comprehensive reform and secret ballot 
(SecretBallotNoCR)  54  2   3 
Table 2: Treatments, sessions and matching-groups 
Germany).  The  data  was  collected  over  9  sessions,  with  219  participants  in  total. 
Participants received a show-up fee of 2 euros ($2.40 at that time).  
The experiment took about one hour and 15 minutes, average income (including 
the show-up fee) was about 14.40 euros ($17.30). The experiment was programmed and 
conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We recruited participants using the online 
recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Participants were part of the LakeLab subject 
pool, including undergraduate and graduate students of all fields of study. 
3  Behavioral predictions 
The sequential bill-by-bill voting procedure 
Committees comprised of selfish members will vote down all bills in the sequential bill-
by-bill voting procedure if commitment devices for vote trading are missing. This holds 
irrespective of whether the voting procedure is transparent or not. Instead, if legislators 
expect their counterparts to reward support (with a sufficiently high probability5) they 
will court for reward by voting for bills preceding their own bill on the sequential voting 
agenda. Assuming first, that legislators are reciprocal and do not support bills preferred 
by legislators who voted down their own preferred bill and second, that legislators do 
not  treat  counterparts  about  whom  they  have  the  same  behavioral  information 
differently,  the  approval  of  the  first  bill  is  weakly  more  likely  than  the  approval  of 
second and third bill (Proposition 1).6 Assuming additionally that the legislator, who 
prefers the last bill on the agenda, does not vote more frequently for the first bill than 
                                                        
5 For a risk neutral subject, the probability of reward pr is sufficiently high if pr> ﾠ1/3 ﾠbecause ﾠvoting ﾠfor ﾠanother’s ﾠbill ﾠ
costs 2 points whereas reward yields 6 additional points. 
6 The proof of this proposition can be found in appendix A.  8 
 
the legislator preferring the second bill, it follows that the approval of the second bill is 
weakly more likely than the approval of the third bill (Proposition 2).7  
The comprehensive reform  
Standard  economic  theory  predicts  that  the  committee  will  approve  the  efficient 
comprehensive  reform  because  committees  comprised  of  selfish  members  will  vote 
down  all  bills  in  the  alternative  sequential  bill-by-bill  procedure.  For  resistance  to 
reform to be caused by something different than decision errors, at least one legislator 
needs to expect another legislator to vote for her bill in the sequential bill-by-bill voting 
procedure. If legislators indeed expect reciprocal behavior by their counterparts with a 
sufficiently  high  probability  (such  that  counterparts  are  willing  to  vote  for  bills 
preceding  their  own  bill  on  the  alternative  sequential  bill-by-bill  agenda),  it  will  be 
worthwhile to veto the comprehensive reform. As explained above, the approval for the 
first bill is weakly more likely than the approval of the second and third bill  on the 
alternative agenda. In turn the probability of a veto is (weakly) higher for legislators 
preferring the first bill than for legislators preferring the second or third bill on the 
agenda.  
Transparency and reform failure 
Standard  economic  theory  predicts  that  the  committee  will  approve  the  efficient 
comprehensive reform irrespective of transparency in the alternative bill by bill voting 
procedure. ﾠ Similarly, ﾠ if ﾠ voting ﾠ for ﾠ another ﾠ legislator’s ﾠ bill ﾠ is ﾠ expected ﾠ to ﾠ result ﾠ from ﾠ
decision  errors,  it  will  occur  irrespective  of  transparency  and  so  does  resistance  to 
reform. If voting for ﾠanother ﾠlegislator’s ﾠbill ﾠinstead ﾠis ﾠexpected ﾠto ﾠresult ﾠfrom ﾠother ﾠ
legislators  courting  for  a  reward  and  the  probability  of  reward  depends  on 
transparency, resistance to reform will depend on transparency as well. We consider it 
as  plausible  to  assume  that  transparency  provides  accountability  and  thus  subjects 
expect a higher probability of reward in the open ballot treatments. Consequently, we 
expect  legislators  to  trust  more  in  their  counterparts,  i.e.  we  expect  votes  for  bills 
preceding ﾠ one’s ﾠ preferred  bill  on  the  alternative  bill-by-bill  agenda  to  occur  more 
frequently in the open ballot treatments, in which the bill-by-bill voting procedure is 
transparent. Resistance to the comprehensive reform is thus also more likely to occur in 
OpenBallotCR.  
                                                        
7 Proof of Proposition 2 can be found in appendix B. Note also that due to the random matching procedure, there is no 
incentive for individual reputation building across periods, which might induce any additional motives for supporting 
monetarily unfavorable reforms. 9 
 
4  Results 
To understand why some members may veto the comprehensive reform it is necessary 
to shed light on the behavioral pattern in the alternative bill-by-bill voting procedures. 
Therefore, we will first discuss the effects of transparency on voting behavior in the 
sequential bill-by-bill voting procedure and second present the results with respect to 
resistance to comprehensive reform.  
Trust and reciprocity in the sequential bill-by-bill voting procedure 
Committee members in our experiment frequently vote for monetarily unfavorable bills. 
Figure 1 illustrates acceptance rates of monetarily unfavorable reforms in the bill-by-bill 
voting  procedure  for  OpenBallotCR  and  SecretBallotCR,  after  the  failure  of  the 
comprehensive  reform,  as  well  as  for  treatments  OpenBallotNoCR  and 
SecretBallotNoCR,  in  which  no  comprehensive  reform  was  available.  Each  column 
represents  the  share  of  members  voting  for  a  reform  bill  which  is  monetarily 
disadvantageous  to  them.  In  the  open  ballot  treatments  (OpenBallotCR  and 
OpenBallotNoCR), the earlier a bill is voted on in the bill-by-bill procedure, the higher 
the  probability  of  its  approval.  For  the  first  bill  two  committee  members  have  an 
incentive to court for positive reciprocity toward members preferring the bills second 
and third on the agenda. When voting on the second bill, the member in favor of the first 
bill  has  a  strong  monetary  incentive  to  reject  the  second  bill  whereas  the  member 
preferring the third bill still has an incentive to vote for the second bill as long as she 
expects  reward  by  the  member  preferring  the  second  bill.  Consequently,  the  actual 
approval rate for the second bill is clearly lower than for the first. The same logic applies 
for the third bill, which is clearly less frequently accepted than the first or second bill.  
We observe 67 percent of members voting for the first bill in OpenBallotNoCR 
although they incur a loss from the approval of this bill, and 40 percent for the second 
bill. In SecretBallotNoCR only 35 percent vote for the first bill and 22 percent for the 
second.  The  regressions  in  Table  3  confirm  that  transparency,  i.e.  information  on 
individual voting behavior, increases the individual acceptance of the first and second 
reforms significantly, whereas transparency does not affect the acceptance of the third 
bill by members preferring earlier bills. We summarize this finding in Result 1. 
Result 1- Transparency increases the probability of acceptance of early bills (first and 
second) in the sequential bill-by-bill voting procedure. 10 
 
In ﾠorder ﾠto ﾠunderstand ﾠwhether ﾠtransparency ﾠincreases ﾠreward, ﾠtrust ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠ
reciprocity, ﾠor ﾠboth, ﾠthe ﾠfurther ﾠanalysis ﾠfocuses ﾠon ﾠreward ﾠbehavior ﾠand ﾠtrust ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠ
reciprocity  (i.e.  expected  reward)  across  treatments.  In  the  open  ballot  treatments 
reward  refers  to  a  situation  in  which  a  committee  member  rewards  her  helping 
counterpart by accepting a subsequent bill favored by the helping counterpart. In the 
secret  ballot  treatments,  committee  members  cannot  identify ﾠ supporters. ﾠ If ﾠ one’s ﾠ
preferred bill is passed, voting for an unfavorable subsequent bill will refer to reward 
with  respect  to  the  group.  In  order  to  make  reward  in  the  open  and  closed  ballot 
treatments comparable, we focus on the share of committee members who accept at 
least one subsequent bill, provided their preferred bill is approved. With respect to trust 
in ﾠ others’ ﾠ reciprocity, ﾠ we ﾠ draw ﾠ conclusions ﾠ from ﾠ the ﾠ acceptances ﾠ of ﾠ preceding ﾠ but ﾠ
monetarily unfavorable bills. We understand trust as a behavior based on an optimistic 
belief, ﾠnamely ﾠbased ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠbelief ﾠof ﾠreward ﾠby ﾠone’s ﾠcounterpart. ﾠWe ﾠuse ﾠthe ﾠprobability 
 
Figure  1:  Share  of  members  accepting  monetarily  unfavorable  bills  (when  CR 
failed) 
Probit (robust std. errors)  CR Treatments 
- after failure of CR  No CR Treatments 
Dep.Var.:   
Acceptance of…  …first bill  …second bill  …first bill  …second bill 
















Pseudo R2  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.03 
Number of Observ.  510  510  840  840 
Std.Err. adjusted for # 
clusters   9  9  6  6 
Table 3: Transparency and the acceptance of monetarily unfavorable reforms 
*p-val.<.10, ** p-val.<.05, *** p-val.<.01 11 
 
of the acceptance of at least one unfavorable preceding bill as a measure for trust. We 
are aware that efficiency concerns might also affect this probability because efficiency 
seekers will always vote for all bills. However, our data suggest efficiency concerns to be 
low. Only 5 percent of subjects vote for an unfavorable bill although their preferred bill 
failed.8 Further efficiency concerns should not vary significantly across treatments and 
thus cannot explain treatments differences in the probability of the acceptance of at 
least one unfavorable preceding bill.  
Table 4 summarizes the shares of members rewarding (accepting at least one 
subsequent ﾠunfavorable ﾠbill ﾠprovided ﾠthe ﾠapproval ﾠof ﾠone’s own bill) and trusting in 
others’ ﾠreciprocity ﾠ(accepting ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠone ﾠpreceding ﾠbill) ﾠfor ﾠthe ﾠfour ﾠtreatments. ﾠThe 
share of members rewarding their counterparts is slightly higher in transparent than in 
secretive  procedures.  25  percent  of  members  reward  their  counterparts  in 
OpenBallotCR, 18 do so in SecretBallotCR, 30 percent do so in OpenBallotNoCR and 24 
percent in SecretBallotNoCR. In open ballot treatments a substantially higher share of 
members ﾠtrusts ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠreciprocity. ﾠIn ﾠOpenBallotCR ﾠ66 ﾠpercent of members accept 
preceding  bills  detrimental  to  their  induced  preferences,  in  SecretBallotCR  only  37 
percent  do  so.  In  OpenBallotNoCR  this  share  amounts  to  75  percent  whereas  in 
SecretBallotNoCR it is only 41 percent. Using Probit regressions (Table 5) we find that 
transparency increases (weakly significantly) reward and (highky significantly) trust. 
Both,  members  in  favor  of  the  second  and  third  bill  accept  preceding  bills  more 
frequently provided that individual voting behavior is observable. We summarize our 
finding in Result 2. 
Result 2 - Transparency increases trust and (weakly) reciprocity. 
                                                        
8 This share has to be considered as a lower bound for efficiency concerns, because not accepting subsequent bills 
after ﾠone’s ﾠown ﾠbill ﾠfailed ﾠcan ﾠbe ﾠcaused ﾠby ﾠnegative ﾠreciprocity ﾠtoo. ﾠ 
Treatment  Reward 
Share of members accepting at least 
one subsequent unfavorable bill  
when own bill is approved 
Trust 
Share of members 
accepting at least one pre-




















(Probability of the acceptance 
of  at  least  one  unfavorable 
subsequent bill when own bill 
is approved) 
Dependent Variable:  
Trust 
(Probability  of  the  acceptance  of 




-0.182  -0.182 
  (0.121)  (0.112) 
Transparency  0.215*  0.823*** 
  (0.119)  (0.125) 
Constant  -0.725***  -0.199 
  (0.089)  (0.144) 
Number of Observ.  814  1,350 
Pseudo R2  0.00734  0.0736 
Prob>Χ2  0.113  0.000 
Std.Err. adjusted 
for # clusters 
15  15 
Table 5: Transparency, reward and trust in others' reciprocity 
*p-val.<.10, ** p-val.<.05, *** p-val.<.01 
Resistance to reform 
We  are  now  ready  to  turn  to  our  main  research  question,  namely  whether  trust  in 
others’ ﾠreciprocity ﾠis ﾠsufficient ﾠto ﾠinduce ﾠresistance ﾠto ﾠcomprehensive ﾠreform. ﾠResult ﾠ1 ﾠ
makes  clear  that  vetoing  a  comprehensive  reform  is  most  attractive  for  members 
preferring  the  first  bill  on  the  alternative  agenda,  when  the  alternative  bill-by-bill 
procedure is an open ballot. We observe committee members preferring the first bill on 
the  alternative  agenda  vetoing  the  comprehensive  reform  in  47  percent  of  cases  in 
OpenBallotCR and 25 percent in SecretBallotCR. Members in favor of later bills on the 
alternative agenda do so in about 16 percent of cases in OpenBallotCR and 20 percent in 
SecretBallotCR,9 resulting in comprehensive reform failure in 63.7 percent of cases in 
OpenBallotCR and 47.5 percent in SecretBallotCR.10 The regression results in Table 6 
make  clear  that  members  preferring  the  first  bill  on  the  alternative  agenda  expect 
profitable  vote  trades  to  be  possible  when  the  sequential  alternative  procedure  is 
transparent and thus impede the comprehensive reform. Members preferring later bills 
mainly opt for the comprehensive reform and are not affected by the transparency of the 
alternative voting procedure. We summarize this finding in Result 3. 
                                                        
9 The latter difference is not statistically significant (Probit with robust std. errors, p-val.>.10). 
10 The latter difference is statistically significant (Probit with robust std. errors, p-val.<.10). 13 
 
Results 3 – Legislators impede comprehensive reforms when they anticipate profitable 
vote trading possibilities on the basis of trust and reciprocity. 
Using  actual  probabilities,  the  expected  payoff  of  blocking  the  package  for  a 
member preferring the first bill amounts to 7.5 points in OpenBallotCR, whereas the 
acceptance  of  the  package  yields  only  6  points.  Thus,  vetoing  behavior  by  members 
preferring the first bill is profitable in the open ballot procedure (OpenBallotCR). The 
expected payoff of resistance to comprehensive reform in the secret ballot treatment 
(SecretBallotCR) is 5.96, which is slightly lower than the payoff of 6 points when the 
comprehensive reform is accepted. Thus, impeding the comprehensive reform in the 
secret ballot treatment does not pay off for members preferring the first bill. The same 
holds  for  members  preferring  later  bills  on  the  agenda.  The  expected  payoffs  from 
vetoing the package for members preferring the second bill (third bill) are 5.37 (2.27) in 
OpenBallotCR and 4.89 (3.11) in SecretBallotCR, i.e. these members have no monetary 
incentive to impede the comprehensive reform. Why do members preferring the first bill 
succeed in vote trading after they block the comprehensive reform? First note that in 
expected terms it is not worthwhile for the second beneficiary to support the first bill. 
However the expected payoff of voting for the first bill (for the member preferring the 
second bill) is only 0.08 points lower than the expected payoff from voting against the 
first bill. By supporting the first bill, a member preferring the second bill loses 2 points 
with certainty but receives a reward of 6 points by the member preferring the first bill 
with  a  probability  of  35  percent.  Without  supporting  the  first  bill  she  receives  not 
support by the member preferring the  first bill. Additionally, voting for the  first bill 
 
Probit  
(robust standard errors)  
Dependent Variable: Probability to vote against 
Comprehensive Reform  









Constant  -0.75*** (0.104)  -0.64 (0.141)***  -1.16 ***(0.310) 
Transparency  0.68 *** (0.174)  -0.03 (0.212)  -0.27  (0.377) 
Pseudo R2  0.05  0.0001  0.0099 
Prob>Χ2  0.00  0.87  0.49 
Number of Observ.  456  456  456 
Std.Err. adjusted for # clusters   9  9  9 
Table 6: Transparency and resistance to reform 
*p-val.<.10, ** p-val.<.05, *** p-val.<.01 14 
 
increases the probability of support for the second bill by the third beneficiary from 36 
to 48 percent.11 Due to the small differences in expected payoffs, second beneficiaries 
may have problems to assess whether or not it is worthwhile to vote for the first bill. 
Also, second beneficiaries may perceive voting for the first bill as a “gamble” ﾠin which 
errors are not very costly. 
Figure 2 indicates that members preferring the first bill on the alternative agenda 
change  their  behavior  over  time.  In  open  ballot  treatments  resistance  to  reform 
increases from about 20 percent in early periods to about 70 percent in late periods. The 
regression in Table 7 confirms that members preferring the first bill on the agenda learn 
to block the comprehensive reform when facing a transparent voting procedure whereas 
resistance to reform stays at a constant level in the secret ballot treatment.  
Result 4 - Legislators whose favorable bill is first on the alternative bill-by-bill agenda 
learn that resistance to comprehensive reforms pays off  
Although we did not display individual voting decisions for the comprehensive reform, 
one may expect negative reciprocity (or a loss in trust) towards those legislators who 
had  the  strongest  incentive to  block the  comprehensive  reform. Indeed,  participants 
seemed to be aware that in the open ballot treatment (OpenBallotCR) beneficiaries of  
 
 
Figure 2: Resistance to reform by members preferring the first bill, over time 
(N=114) 
                                                        
11 We cannot infer whether the latter increase is due to positive signaling or because members preferring the third 
bill expect the second bill to be passed anyway and therefore have nothing to lose by voting for the second bill.  15 
 
Probit Regression  
(robust standard errors) 
Vote against  
comprehensive Reform  




-0.09       (0.388) 
0.01        (0.008) 
0.12***  (0.034) 
Pseudo R2  0.10 
Number of Observ.  456 
Robust Std.Err. adjusted for # clusters   9 
Table 7: Resistance to comprehensive reform by members  
preferring the first bill 
*p-val.<.10, ** p-val.<.05, *** p-val.<.01 
the first bill on the agenda were most likely to impede the comprehensive reform. As 
Figure  1  already  indicates,  the  support  for  the  first  bill  by  members  preferring  the 
second or third bill is significantly stronger in the NoCR treatments compared to the CR 
treatments after failure of the comprehensive reform.12 When the comprehensive reform 
failed, members in favor of the comprehensive reform voted less frequently for the first 
bill whereas they voted more frequently for the second and third bills (see Table 8). 
Negative reciprocity (or a loss in trust) towards against the member preferring the first 
bill did not increase over time and its quantitative effect on actual approval rates was 
small. Thus, beneficiaries of the first bill on the agenda still had an incentive to impede 
the comprehensive reform. 
  Finally,  we  turn  to  the  question  of  whether  the  failure  of  the  comprehensive 
reform causes a general loss in trust and reciprocity among committee members. To do 
so, we compare the share of members trusting/reciprocating in the treatments with the 
possibility  of  voting  on  a  comprehensive  reform  with  treatments  in  which  no 
 
Probit (robust standard. 
errors) 
Vote for first Bill  Vote for second 
Bill 
Vote for third 
Bill 
Constant  0.55*** (0.170)  -0.83*** (0.184)  -1.60*** (0.105) 
Vote for CR  -0.51** (0.237)  0.66*** (0.197)  0.53*** (0.202) 
Pseudo R2  0.02  0.05  0.04 
Number of Observ.  316  316  316 
Robust Std.Err. adjusted  
for  # clusters  
5  5  5 
Table 8: Discrimination after comprehensive reform failure (OpenBallotCR) 
Dep. Variables: Acceptance of monetarily unfavorable bills (first, second or third bill)  
*p-val.<.10, ** p-val.<.05, *** p-val.<.01 
                                                        




Dependent Variable: Reward  
 
Dependent Variable: Trust 
 
  Open Ballot  Secret Ballot  Open Ballot  Secret Ballot 
















Pseudo R2  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.002 
Prob>Χ2 









Std.Err. adjusted for 
# clusters  
8  7  8  7 
Table 9: The Impact of Failure of Comprehensive Reform on Trust and Reciprocity 
*p-val.<.10, ** p-val.<.05, *** p-val.<.01 
comprehensive  reform  is  available.  Table  4  illustrates  that  after  the  failure  of 
comprehensive  reform  25  percent  of  members  rewarded  others’ ﾠ support ﾠ in ﾠ
OpenBallotCR and 18 percent did so in SecretBallotCR, whereas these shares amount to 
31  percent  in  OpenBallotNoCR  and  24  percent  in  SecretBallotNoCR.  With  respect  to 
trust ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠreciprocity ﾠwe ﾠobserve ﾠ66 ﾠpercent ﾠof ﾠmembers ﾠvoting ﾠfor ﾠat ﾠleast ﾠone ﾠ
preceding  bill  in  OpenBallotCR  and  37  percent  in  SecretBallotCR  after  the 
comprehensive  reform  failed,  whereas  these  shares  amount  to  75  percent  in 
OpenBallotNoCR and 41 percent in SecretBallotNoCR when no comprehensive reform 
was available. Thus, the impact of comprehensive reform failure on reciprocity is weak 
and reduces trust in open ballot treatments only slightly (Table 9).  
6  Conclusion 
We showed in a laboratory experiment that the expectation of profitable vote trades 
leads to resistance to comprehensive reform. According to standard economic theory, 
vote  trading  in  our  experiment  is  impossible  because  commitment  devices  for  vote 
trading  are  missing.  Consequently,  resistance  to  comprehensive  reform  should  not 
occur.  Nevertheless  we  observe  resistance  to  the  comprehensive  reform. 
Comprehensive reform failure results, because legislators expect profitable vote trades 
even with an imperfect device for vote trading, namely a transparent sequential bill-by-
bill voting procedure. The transparent voting procedure provides accountability, which 
allows legislators to court for positive reciprocity. Because legislators expect others to 
trust in their reciprocity, they impede efficient comprehensive reforms and trade votes 17 
 
after comprehensive reform failure. Eventually majority coalitions emerge who trade 
votes at the cost of third parties.  
Trust ﾠin ﾠothers’ ﾠreciprocity ﾠabates ﾠsubstantially ﾠwhen ﾠindividual ﾠvoting ﾠbehavior ﾠ
is  not  observable.  In  turn,  vote  trading  becomes  difficult  and  resistance  to 
comprehensive reform subsides. We do not claim that secretive procedures can solve 
the  reform  deadlock  in  real  world  policy  making.  Instead,  we  take  our  results  as  a 
warning  that  resistance  to  comprehensive  reform  can  stem  from  any  source  which 
facilitates vote trades or secret agreements.  
The importance of trust and reciprocity for resistance to reform might be smaller 
with asymmetric payoffs, private knowledge about preferences over bills and a larger 
number of decision makers. However, the importance of trust and reciprocity might also 
be  larger,  because  in  contrast  to  real  world  voting  decisions,  legislators  in  the 
experiment could not directly communicate to agree on a vote trade. Also, the small size 
of the voting body does not have to be interpreted as a small number of legislators in 
general. In representative democracies, usually only a small number of political parties 
exist. If party members are strictly adherent to the party line, decisions will eventually 
be made by a small number of groups. Resistance to reform may then result from parties 
(instead of individual legislators) strategically vetoing comprehensive reforms.  
Our  results  shed  new  light  on  role  of  trust  and  reciprocity  when  designing 
optimal  political  decision  making  procedures.  Typically  trust  and  reciprocity  are 
associated  with  positive  welfare  effects,  for  instance  in  trust  games  or  public  goods 
games. However, it is not completely uncommon that social preferences can lower social 
welfare, in particular, because they foster coordination also when coordination results 
in cooperation against others. Social preferences may for instance facilitate collusion in 
oligopolies or within group cooperation in rent seeking contests between groups (in 
which within group cooperation increases the amount of wasted money).13 In a similar 
way, trust and reciprocity foster coordination and in turn cooperation against others in 
our  voting  experiment.  Trust  and  reciprocity  increased  total  payoffs  as  long  as  the 
possibility for a comprehensive reform was missing. If instead a comprehensive reform 
were  available,  trust  and  reciprocity  would  lead  to  resistance  to  the  comprehensive 
reform and in turn to lower total payoffs.    
                                                        
13 See e.g. Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori (2010). 18 
 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
With the following two assumptions, we derive Proposition 1:  
(i)  Legislators are reciprocal and do not support bills of legislators who 
turned down their own bill  
(ii)  Legislators  do  not  discriminate  against  particular  counterparts,  i.e., 
they treat agents differently only when they have different information 
about their behavior 
 
Proposition 1 - The approval of the second bill and the approval of the third bill is not 
more likely than the approval of the first bill 
Proof.  If  the  first  bill  is  not  accepted  then  both  the  second  and  the  third 
beneficiary have turned down the first bill. According to (i) the first beneficiary will not 
vote for any subsequent bill. Further, because of (ii), the third beneficiary will also vote 
against the second bill. Finally, also the third bill will be turned down because the third 
beneficiary did not support any preceding bill. Thus, it is not possible that the second or 
the third bill is approved more frequently than the first bill.    
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 
Assuming (i), (ii) and  
(iii)  Subjects in the role of the third beneficiary do not vote more frequently 
for the first bill than subjects in the role of the second beneficiary.  
 
we derive proposition 2.  
Proposition 2 – The approval of the third bill is not more likely than the approval of the 
second bill. 
Proof. We first prove the proposition for voting with partial information. Let us 
start  with  the  case  in  which  the  first  bill  fails.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  proof  for 
proposition 2.1, both the second and the third bills will be turned down in this case. We 
now turn to the case in which the first bill is approved. Due to (ii) the first beneficiary 
either votes for both or none of the subsequent bills. If she accepts both bills, both the 
second and third bills are approved. If she votes against the second and third bills, the 
second bill can only fail if the third beneficiary votes against it. However, in this case the 
third bill will also receive no support by the second beneficiary (due to (i)) and will also 
fail.  19 
 
Let us now turn to the full information case. So far, we have shown that when a 
bill  fails,  the  subsequent  bills  fail  as  well.  This  is  not  necessarily  true  in  the  full 
information condition. Here it is possible that the third beneficiary supports only the 
first  beneficiary  and  receives  reward  by  the  first  beneficiary  whereas  the  second 
beneficiary does not support the first bill and receives support neither from the first 
beneficiary  (due  to  (i))  nor  from  the  third  beneficiary  because  the  third  beneficiary 
knows  that  the  second  beneficiary  turned  down  the  first  bill.  Hence  it  is  in  general 
possible to observe the committee passing only the first and the third bills. We will now 
show that it is nevertheless not possible that the third bill is on average approved more 
frequently than the second due to (iii). Consider two different matching protocols: In 
matching  1,  participant  A  is  the  first  beneficiary,  participant  B  is  the  second  and 
participant  C  is  the  third  beneficiary.  Thus  participant  A  received  support  from 
participant ﾠC ﾠand ﾠtherefore ﾠalso ﾠvoted ﾠfor ﾠparticipant ﾠC’s ﾠbill. ﾠIn ﾠmatching ﾠ2 ﾠinstead ﾠthe ﾠ
participants are matched differently so that participant A is still the first beneficiary, but 
participant C is now second beneficiary and participant B is now the third beneficiary.  
This means that participant A received support by participant C, who is now second 
beneficiary and participant B who is now third beneficiary does not vote for the first bill, 
and due to (i) and (ii) does not receive any support. Thus with random matching we can 
conclude that on average the third bill cannot be approved more frequently than the 
second bill.     
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Appendix C: Instructions (translated from German) 
We present a full translation of the instructions for the OpenBallotCR. Instructions for 
OpenBallotNoCR are identical, except for the decision on the package, which is missing 
there. In the treatments with a secret ballot we modified the instructions at the relevant 
parts.  We  indicate  these  modifications  after  the  translated  instructions  for 
OpenBallotCR. The general information is identical in all treatments.  
General information (Participant A) 
Today you take part in an economic decision making experiment. If you read the following 
instructions carefully, you will be able to earn money additionally to your show-up fee of 2 
Euro. Therefore it is important that you read the instructions completely.  
For  the  entire  duration  of  the  experiment,  it  is  not  allowed  to  communicate  with  other 
participants.  We  therefore  ask  you  not  to  talk  to  each  other.  If  you  have  problems 
understanding the experiment, please have a second look at the instructions. If you still have 
questions,  please  give  us  a  hand  signal.  We  will  come  to  your  cubicle  and  answer  your 
questions personally. During the experiment, we do not talk about Euro, we talk about points. 
The numbers of points you earn in the experiment are converted into Euro with the following 
exchange rate. 
1 ﾠPoint ﾠ= ﾠ€ ﾠ0,20 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the 2 Euros show-up fee plus the equivalent of 
all points received in the experiment in cash. The following pages will explain the experiment 
in detail. At the end of the instructions we added some control questions helping  you to 
understand the sequence of events. The experiment does not start until all participants solved 
the control questions and are completely familiar with the course of the experiment. 
Summary 
This experiment has 12 periods. In each period you will form a group with two randomly 
determined participants. At the beginning of a period each participant receives 4 Points. Then 
you and the other two members of the group decide on three different bills. The bills affect 
the points of each group member. A period ends when the group made a decision on all three 
bills.  Then,  a  new  period  starts.  You  form  a  new  group  with  two  randomly  chosen 
participants. All over you decide on three bills in 12 Periods. After the final period you will 
see a summary table on screen showing your points earned in each period.  
At the end of the experiment you receive the 2 Euro show-up plus the euro equivalent of 
points earned in cash.  21 
 
The Experiment 
In this experiment we speak of three different participants, Participant A, B and C.  You are a 
Participant A. In each period you form a group of three members with a randomly chosen 
participant B and a randomly chosen participant C. At the beginning of each period each 
participant receives 4 points. There are three bills to be voted on in each Period. We label 
them Bill A, B and C, respectively. First the group chooses if all three bills shall be accepted 
simultaneously or not.  
If all members of the group decide to vote on the acceptance of all three bills, the vote on this 
package  of  bills  takes  place.    Each  member  votes  (simultaneously)  for  or  against  the 
acceptance of all three bills. If a majority of the group (at least two members) votes for the 
acceptance of all three bills, the bills are accepted.  
If the group does not unanimously agree on voting on all three bills at once, the group decides 
sequentially on the three bills. If a majority (at least two members of the group) accepts a bill, 
it is passed.  
The bills in detail: Each of the three bills yields 6 additional points for one group member but 
subtracts two points from each of the other two members. 
Bill  A: Participant A receives 6 additional Points, 2 points are subtracted from Participant B 
and C (each).  
Bill B: Participant B receives 6 additional Points, 2 points are subtracted from Participant A 
and C (each). 
Bill C: Participant C receives 6 additional Points, 2 points are subtracted from Participant A 
and B (each).  
Each bill can be accepted or rejected by the group. Thus it is possible that more than one bill 
is accepted or rejected.  The order in which the bills are voted on is determined randomly.  
The six possible sequences are: 
Sequence  1st Bill  2nd Bill  3rd Bill 
1  Bill A  Bill B  Bill C 
2  Bill A  Bill C  Bill B 
3  Bill B  Bill A  Bill C 
4  Bill B  Bill C  Bill A 
5  Bill C  Bill A  Bill B 
6  Bill C  Bill B  Bill A 22 
 
At the beginning of each Period, namely before the decision on the first bill, the sequence of 
bills is displayed on your computer screen.  
Procedures are the following 
Step 1 – Decision on the voting procedure 
Participants of each group see the three bills and the possible sequence, given the group 
decides for the sequential procedure.  
Each participant states in Step 1 if she is for or against voting on all bills at once. If all 
participants of a group decide to vote on all bills at once Step 2a comes next, otherwise it 
follows Step 2b.  
 
Step 2a – Simultaneous Procedure (only if all members of the group agreed on voting on 
the three bills at once) 
Each participant of the group states if she is for or against accepting all bills at once. It 
follows Step 3. 
Step 2b – Sequential Procedure (only if at least one member of the group disagreed on 
voting on the three bills at once in Step 1)  
In this Step, you see the bill put to vote. You state whether you are for or against this bill. 
Step 2c follows. 
Step 2c – Outcome of the vote on a single bill (only if at least one member of the group 
disagreed on voting on the three bills at once in Step 1)  
After all participants of a group made their choice, the result of the current vote will be 
displayed on the computer screen. A bill is accepted if a majority of the group voted for the 
bill, i.e. if two or three group members voted for the bill.  
In this Step you can also see which participant of your group decided for/against the current 
bill.  
It follows the decision on the next bill. This means you see the next bill put for vote and 
decide on this bill (see Step 2b). Then, you see the outcome of this vote (see Step 2c). 





Step 3 – Result 
After voting on the three bills, a summary table is presented on your computer screen. It 
shows which bills  passed or failed in  this  period. Also,  it displays the  number of points 
earned.  
 
After Step 3 you are again randomly matched with two participants and form a new group.  
When the new period starts, no participant receives any information on your voting behavior 
from previous periods. Also, you do not receive any information on the voting behavior from 
previous ﾠperiods ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠnew ﾠgroup’s ﾠparticipants. ﾠNeither ﾠbefore ﾠnor ﾠafter ﾠthe ﾠexperiment, ﾠwill ﾠ
you ﾠ receive ﾠ any ﾠ information ﾠ about ﾠ your ﾠ counterparts’ ﾠ identity. ﾠ The ﾠ randomly ﾠ selected ﾠ
participants who interact with you do also not receive any information on your identity.  
Payment 
At the end of the experiment you receive the 2 Euro show-up plus the euro equivalent of 
points reached in cash.  
We now present an example which helps you to understand the course of the experiment on 
screen in more detail. At the end of this example you will find some control questions. Please 
write down your answers to these questions. Your answers to these questions will not affect 
the amount of money you will receive at the end of the experiment. 24 
 
Course of the experiment on the computer screen– an example 
Step 1 – Decision on the voting procedure 
All Participant of the group see the three bills and the randomly selected order in which they 
will be voted on in case of a sequential voting procedure.  
Each participant decides in this Step, whether she is for or against voting on the three bills at 
once.  
If all participants of a group decide for voting on the three bills at once Step 2a will follow, 
otherwise continue with Step 2b. 
A screenshot of Step1 (in this example): 
 
The first line in the table shows the randomly selected order of bills (in this example: 1st Bill 
B, 2nd Bill C and 3rd Bill A). 
Below we present how each bill will change the amount of points of each participant, if a 
majority accepts this bill.   
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In this example: 
 
1
st Bill B: Participant B receives 6 additional Points, 2 points are subtracted from Participant 
A and C.  
2
nd Bill C: Participant C receives 6 additional Points, 2 points are subtracted from Participant 
A and B. 
3
rd Bill A:  Participant A receives 6 additional Points, 2 points are subtracted from Participant 
B and C. 
If a bill is not accepted by a majority, it does not affect the points of any participant.  
Step 2a – Simultaneous voting Procedure  
We now look at the case in which all participants of a group decided to vote on the three bills 
at once. Then the participants see the following screen: 
 
Each Participant of the group now chooses to accept /or reject all bills at once. 
If a majority, at least 2 participants of the group, decides to accept all bills at once, all three 
bills are accepted. If a majority votes against all three bills, the bills are rejected. It follows 26 
 
Step 3. 
Step 2b – Sequential procedure 
Now we look at the case in which at least one participant of a group decided not to agree on 
voting on the three bills at once. This means, bills are now voted on sequentially, in the 
previously displayed order.  In our example, first Bill B, then Bill C and finally Bill A: 
 
You decide whether to accept/reject ﾠthe ﾠcurrent ﾠbill ﾠand ﾠclick ﾠthe ﾠ„OK“-Button. After all 
participants of the group made their decision, the voting result is displayed. 
 
Let us assume that, in our example, Participant B accepted the 1
st bill, You (Participant A) and 
Participant C, however, rejected the 1
st bill. The intermediate result (Step 2c) is displayed on 
your computer screen: 
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Step 2c – Outcome of the vote on a single bill 
 
The table again shows the order in which the bills are voted on. And who voted for or against 
a bill. In the last line you see whether a bill was accepted or rejected by the majority of the 
group. In our example a majority (You and participant C) voted against the first bill. Thus in 
this example the table shows that the 1
st bill was rejected by a majority. Consequently, the 
points ﾠof ﾠall ﾠparticipants ﾠin ﾠyour ﾠgroup ﾠare ﾠnot ﾠaffected. ﾠBy ﾠclicking ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠ“continue” ﾠbutton ﾠ
you will come to the next decision. 
Now ﾠvoting ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠsecond ﾠbill ﾠbegins. ﾠThen ﾠyou ﾠsee ﾠthe ﾠresult ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠgroup’s ﾠdecision ﾠon ﾠ
screen. Let’s ﾠassume ﾠa ﾠmajority ﾠof ﾠthe ﾠgroup ﾠaccepted ﾠthe ﾠsecond ﾠbill. ﾠ 
Then ﾠvoting ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠthird ﾠbill ﾠstarts. ﾠYou ﾠsee ﾠthe ﾠthird ﾠbill ﾠand ﾠdecide ﾠfor ﾠor ﾠagainst ﾠit. ﾠLet’s ﾠ
assume for our example that again a majority accepted the third bill.  
We continue with Step 3. 
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Step 3 – Result  
At the end of a period and independent from the voting procedure chosen by your group, you 
will see a summary table showing points received by you and your group members.  
In  the  following  we  explain  how  the  points  received  in  the  period  of  our  example  are 
calculated. 
In case of voting on the three bills at once, (continued from Step 2a) there are two possible 
outcomes:  
The majority accepts all bills at once. 
This yields for each participant of the group: 
 4 points   (endowment)  
+6 points   (by the one bill in favor of the participant) 
-4 points   (by the two bills in favor of the other two group members) 
= 6 points  
All bills were rejected at once. 
This yields 4 points for each participant (the endowment) 
Given  the  group  decided  for  the  sequential  procedure,  (continued  from  Step  2c)  points 
received at the end of a period are calculated as follows: 29 
 
 
The table displays again the order in which bills where voted on. Additionally you see in the 
second line whether a bill was accepted or rejected by the majority of the group. In our 
example the first bill was rejected, whereas the other two bills were accepted.  Endowment is 
4 points.  
The first bill did not affect the points received by participants in this group, because it was 
rejected. The second bill was accepted and yields participant C six additional points, whereas 
2 points are subtracted from participant A and B each. The third bill was accepted too in our 
example. It yields six additional points for participant A, and subtracts two points from each 
of the other two participants. 
Points received at the end of the period by each participant are calculated as follows: 
Points Participant A = 4 + 0 - 2 + 6     = 8    
Points Participant B = 4 +0 - 2 -2       = 0    
Points Participant C = 4 + 0 + 6 – 2    = 8    
After ﾠclicking ﾠthe ﾠ„OK“– Button, you are randomly matched into a new group. 
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Control questions 
Please read the new example on this page and answer the control questions.  





Assume that at least one participant of the group decided against voting at once on the three 
bills. 
Assume ﾠfurther… 
You accept the 1st and 3rd bill.  
Participant B accepts the 1
st and 3
rd bill. 
Participant C accepts the 1st and 2nd bill  
 
Which bills are accepted by a majority of the group?   ___________________________ 
How many points do you receive in this period?      ____________________________ 
How many points does participant B receive in this period?   ______________________ 
How many points does participant C receive in this period?   ______________________ 
□correct or □wrong: ﾠ„If ﾠtwo ﾠof ﾠthree ﾠgroup ﾠmembers ﾠdecide ﾠfor ﾠvoting ﾠon ﾠthe ﾠthree ﾠbills ﾠat ﾠ




[Change of instructions for Treatments SecretBallotCR OpenBallotNoCR 
and Secret NoCR] 
The Experiment 
In this experiment we speak of three different participants. Participant A, B and C. You are a 
Participant A. In each period you form a group of three members with a randomly chosen 
participant B and a randomly chosen participant C. 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 4 points. 
There are three bills to be voted on in each period and group. We label them Bill A, Bill B 
and C respectively. Each group chooses weather to pass or fail each bill sequentially. If a 
majority (at least two members of the group) accepts a bill, it is passed. The order of bills is 
random. 
The ﾠbills ﾠin ﾠdetail: ﾠ… [See instructions for OpenBallotCR] 
Procedures are ﾠthe ﾠfollowing… 
Step  1 – Determination of the agenda 
A random process determines the order of the bills.  
Step 2  Agenda display 
Participants can see the current order of bills on their computer screens. It follows step 3... 
Step 3 – Sequential Procedure 
In this step you see which bill is currently voted on. You decide if you accept or reject the bill.  
 
Step 4 – Result 
After all participants of a group made their choice, the result of the current vote will be 
displayed on the computer screen. A bill is accepted if a majority of the group voted for the 
bill, i.e. if two or three group members voted for the bill.  
[Only the open ballot treatments OpenBallotCR and OpenBallotNoCR:] In this step you 
can also see which participant of your group decided for/against the current bill 
After voting on the three bills, a summary table is presented on your computer screen. It 
shows which bills  passed or failed in  this  period. Also,  it displays the  number of points 
earned.  After Step 4 you are again randomly matched with two participants and form a new 
group.    32 
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